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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of the external institutional environment captured by 
effective state-business relations on firm performance. By effective state-business 
relations, we mean a set of highly institutionalised, responsive and public interactions 
between the state and the business sector. We find that effective state-business 
relations have had a discernible positive impact on firm performance in Indian formal 
manufacturing for the years 2000-01 and 2004-05. We also find internal and external 
institutional factors are complementary to firm performance - smaller firms, firms in 
urban areas, older firms and firms in simpler organizational forms benefit more.  
 
Keywords: State business relations, firm productivity, manufacturing sector, India. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: L25, O53, O43.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Why are some firms more productive than others? Much of the previous literature on 
the determinants of firm performance has highlighted the role of the institutional 
factors that are internal to the firm such as the firm’s ownership structure (Boardman 
and Vining 1989, Chhibber and Majumdar 1998, 1999, Khanna and Palepu 2000), the 
ability of its managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1989), the investments that the firm’s 
owners makes in human capital of its employees (Bates 1990, Becker and Barry 1996) 
and the innovative capabilities of the firm (Penrose 1959, Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Cimoli et al. 2009). Less attention has been paid to the external institutional 
determinants of firm performance, and in particular the relationship between the state 
and the business sector.1  In this paper, we examine the role of effective state-business 
relations in influencing firm performance using Indian manufacturing as a case-study. 
By effective state-business relations, we mean a set of highly institutionalised, 
responsive and public interactions between the state and the business elite. As has 
been noted in the case of East Asia, strong industrial performance has occurred in 
contexts where there were strong collaborative relations between the political and 
economic elites (Aoki 2001, Amsden 2001).   
Effective state-business relations occur when there is ‘the maintenance of benign 
collaboration between the agents of the state and business’ (Harriss 2006). Benign 
collaboration between agents of the state and business require strong, well organised 
and representative business associations and effective and accountable governments 
that have a strong interest in the growth of the private sector. Well organised business 
associations can contribute to firm performance by providing both market-supporting 
and market-complementing activities (Cammett 2007). Through market-supporting 
activities, business associations can strengthen the overall functioning of markets by 
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supporting the provision of public goods such as electricity and roads which are 
critical for productive investments to take place. Market-complementing activities, on 
the other hand, address various types of market imperfections and involve ‘direct 
coordination among firms to reconcile production and investment decisions’ (Doner 
and Schneider 2000). Effective and accountable governments can deliver on the 
services and public goods that are essential for robust private sector growth such as 
infrastructure and law and order. Strong states can make credible commitments on 
key policies such as future rates of corporate taxation and the likelihood of 
nationalisation of private sector assets. Such commitments are essential for the firms 
to invest in human capital and machinery and equipment that are likely to boost firm 
performance (Sen and te Velde, 2009).  
Our empirical context is India, which provides us a fertile empirical ground to 
examine the relationship between effective state-business relations and economic 
performance at the firm level. Given India’s federal political structure, we would 
expect to see wide variations in the manner Indian state governments interact with the 
business sector. Given the move from a command and control regime by Indian policy 
makers since 1991 and the political space that economic reforms provided to state 
governments to follow their own paths with specific economic policies (within certain 
constraints), we would expect significant variation in effective state-business relations 
across Indian states. We exploit these institutional differences of Indian states testing 
for the impact of effective state-business relations (SBRs) on firm performance for the 
Indian formal manufacturing sector. We first propose a way of quantifying the degree 
of effectiveness of SBRs for fifteen Indian states, which has been developed by Calì, 
Mitra and Purohit (henceforth, CMP, 2009). We then use this measure in augmented 
production function estimates of firm performance using a rich firm-level data set 
5 
 
which covers all firms in the Indian formal manufacturing sector for the years 2000-
01 and 2004-05 to examine whether effective SBRs matter for firm performance. We 
also explore whether institutional factors internal to the firm such as firm size, firm 
age, location and organisational form influence the manner effective SBRs impact on 
firm performance. We find that effective state-business relations have had a 
discernible positive impact on firm performance in India. We also find effective state-
business relations particularly benefit smaller firms, firms in urban areas, older firms 
and firms with simpler organisational forms such as sole proprietorships and family 
firms (in contrast to firms with diffused ownership).  
The rest of the paper is in five sections. In the next section, we set out the theoretical 
argument why effective state-business relations matter for firm performance. In 
Section III, we describe the measure of state-business relations in India, drawing from 
the work of Cali, Mitra and Purohit (2009) (henceforth, CMP). Section IV describes 
the firm-level data and the methodology. In Section V, we discuss the results of our 
analysis. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. WHY DO EFFECTIVE STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS MATTER FOR 
FIRM PERFORMANCE? 
The literature on state-business relations takes the following elements as essential 
characteristics of effective state-business relations (SBRs) (see Maxfield and 
Schneider 1997, Chapter 1). 
• Transparency: the flow of accurate and reliable information, both ways, between 
business and government. 
• Reciprocity: the capacity and autonomy of state actions to secure improved 
performance in return for subsidies. 
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• Credibility: when capitalists are able to believe what state actors say. 
Effective SBRs as characterised above can affect firm performance through fulfilling 
a number of economic functions. Firstly, they can help to solve information related 
market and co-ordination failures in areas such as skill development or infrastructure 
provision (Amsden 1989). For instance, business associations or government 
departments may co-ordinate and disperse information among stakeholders. Greater 
transparency in the flow of information between state actors and the business sector 
leads to a better allocation of investments by the business sector to their most 
productive uses. Higher credibility of state actions lead to less problems of time and 
dynamic inconsistency of government policies, providing a more favourable 
environment for high quality investment to occur (Rodrik 1991, Ibarra 1995). 
Reciprocity ensures improved performance by private sector actors in return for 
subsidies and the provision of public goods, contributing to higher productivity 
growth.  
Secondly, effective SBRs provide a check and balance function on government 
policies and tax and expenditure plans (te Velde 2006). Thus, effective SBRs may 
help to ensure that the provision of infrastructure is appropriate and of good quality. 
The design of effective government policies and regulations depends, among other 
things, on input from and consultation with the private sector. Regular sharing of 
information between the state and businesses ensures that private sector objectives are 
met with public action and that local level issues are fed into higher level policy 
processes (Evans 1995). The private sector can identify constraints, opportunities, and 
possible policy options for creating incentives, lowering investment risks, and 
reducing the cost of doing business. More efficient institutions and rules and 
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regulations might be achieved through policy advocacy which could reduce the costs 
and risks faced by firms and enhance productivity. 
In summary, effective state-business relations can mitigate both market failures and 
government failures which are pervasive in most developing countries, and by doing 
so, bring about an increase in the performance of firms.2 
 
III. MEASURING STATE BUSINESS RELATIONS IN INDIA 
te Velde (2006) was the pioneering study to develop measures of SBRs quality. He 
argues that an SBR index should have four components, which reflect the main 
aspects of effective SBRs:  
1) the way in which the private sector is organised vis-à-vis the public sector; 
2) the way in which the public sector is organised vis-à-vis the private sector; 
3) the practice and institutionalisation of SBRs; 
4) the avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour between the two sectors. 
Each of the aspects mentioned above is captured through a SBR sub-index which in 
turn is derived from data on variables reflecting the above mentioned aspects. The 
various SBR sub-indices are then combined to arrive at an overall index of SBR. 
CMP measure SBR along the above four dimensions for 15 Indian states using both 
primary and secondary data. We describe below the manner CMP operationalise the 
measurement of SBR in India. 
The role of the private sector in SBR  
CMP measure the role of the private sector via the quality and effectiveness of the 
umbrella business association and two sector based business associations, as follows: 
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a) Whether the private sector association has a website or not: The variable takes 
a value of zero in any year in which the organisation does not have a website 
and 1 otherwise. This is likely to proxy for the quality of the organisational 
structure as well as its outside visibility. Evidence from their fieldwork 
confirms that organisations appearing to be more structured and organised 
have had an active website in place for a longer time. 
b) How frequently the website is updated: Again, this captures the efficiency of 
internal processes (which makes frequent updates possible) as well as the level 
of activity of the organisation. The need for updating the website more 
frequently should increase with the intensity of the organisation’s activity.  
c) The variable office_premise, takes the value of 1 if the office is owned and 0 
otherwise. This variable proxies the level of the organisation’s resources as 
well as the extent to which the association is willing to invest in costly 
physical assets.  
The role of the public sector in SBR 
CMP measure the role of the public sector in SBR by the presence of state owned or 
state participated productive corporations, which are investment promotion agencies, 
Financial, Infrastructure Development and Tourism Development Corporations. 
These represent important types of pro-business engagements with benefits for all 
sectors. They construct a cumulative sub-index ranging in value between 0 and 1 
which is the average of four dummy variables, one for each organisation. At any point 
of time the dummy for an organisation takes the value of 1 if it is in place and 0 
otherwise.  
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CMP also assess the role of the public sector via the governments’ signalling of their 
relative priorities through the allocation of public resources. In their work, they focus 
on two types of state revenue expenditures: expenditure on economic services as a 
ratio of total government expenditures and expenditure on industries as a ratio of total 
expenditures on economic services.  
The interaction between states and businesses 
CMP measure the interaction between state governments and the business sector in 
two ways: 
a) Index of labour regulation: This is the index constructed by Besley and 
Burgess (2004). The authors score each state level act on labour regulation as anti-
worker (assigning -1), pro-worker (1) or neutral (0). In this way they produce a 
yearly cumulative index which may proxy for the relative effectiveness of the 
mentioned aspect of SBR. The argument is that more effective SBRs would allow 
employers to be more influential affecting on government policies and would get 
reflected in more pro-employer labour market regulation.  
b) Stamp Duty: CMP take state-wise stamp duties as proxies for the attitude of the state 
governments towards business establishments and their expansion. These proxies are 
valid because a stamp duty is a tax on the value of a transaction, most commonly on the 
transfer of movable and immovable properties and instruments used in commercial and 
business transactions.  
Mechanisms to avoid collusive behaviour  
CMP use the following measures to capture the transparency of SBRs:  
a) The gross output of firms belonging to delicensed industries as a proportion 
of total industrial GDP (data on delicensing from Aghion et al. 2006; data on 
firms by sector in the Annual Survey of Industries): The License Raj was a 
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system of centralised controls regulating entry and production activity. 
Delicensing introduced competition and reduced rent-seeking by corporations 
entrenched with public powers. As the decision of which industries to 
delicense was made at the central level, this effectively provides an exogenous 
source of change in the possible extent of collusive behaviour at the state 
level. 
b) Whether the private sector umbrella association has a regular publication 
informing its members. This measure proxies for the transparency of the 
organisation’s activities. Higher transparency would be associated with lower 
probability of collusive behaviour which may harm business not entrenched 
with public authorities. As in the case of the organisation’s website, the 
frequency with which the publication is produced and distributed would also 
determine the level of transparency in the association’s activities.  
As CMP correctly argue, the indices constructed through these variables have two 
main advantages over the traditional investment climate indicators. First, they cover a 
larger time span (27 years from 1980 to 2006) than any other indicators on Indian 
states. This allows one to examine the evolution of the relevant economic institution 
over different periods. Second, by not being based on firms’ perceptions, they avoid 
the measurement error problem typical of subjective survey response data. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2001) argue that the likely causal correlation of this measurement 
error with dependent variables may generate biased estimated coefficients. Carlin et 
al. (2009) explain along these lines the problem of interpreting the coefficients of 
standard cross-country regressions where a productivity or income measure is 
regressed on subjective constraints.  
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CMP normalize the data so as to make the variables vary over a common range and to 
make the increase in a variable signal an improvement in the index. While CMP used 
different weighting procedures in the construction of the SBR private variable, we use 
the weighting procedure where the apex business association is assigned a value of 
0.5 and the two sectoral associations are assigned a value of 0.25 each.3  
In Figure 1, we present the period averaged SBR measures for 1994-2000 and 2001-
2005. As is clear, there are strong differences in the effectiveness of state-business 
relations across Indian states. These differences seem to have persisted over time. 
Bihar and Orissa, among the less industrialized states, have the least degree of 
effectiveness of state-business relations while Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the 
more progressive states, have the highest degree of effectiveness as reflected in the 
SBR measure. Assam has shown the highest improvement in the effectiveness of 
state-business relations between 1994 and 2005.  
 
 
Source: CMP (2009)  
Figure 1: State-Business Relations, 1994-2000 and 2001-2005 across Indian states 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
We use unit level data for the formal manufacturing sectors for two years – 2000-01 
and 2004-05. Data are drawn from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) collected by 
the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO). The ASI is the census survey of all the 
formal manufacturing units for all the industries across all the states. The data is 
collected every year from all the units registered under the Indian Factories Act of 
1948.4 CSO is the agency that collects information on various aspects of the 
functioning units. The information collected include - gross output, number of 
workers, gross fixed assets, electricity and materials consumed, ownership, profit etc. 
at the unit level. The data are in the form of repeated cross-sections, and not in panel 
form. This is because the CSO do not reveal the identity of the firm/plant in the unit 
record data.5  
Methodology 
Our variable of interest is the measure of state-business relations that we described in 
Section III and its effect on firm’s total factor productivity (TFP). To test the effect of 
SBR on TFP, we estimate augmented production functions as follows: 
isjisisjisjisj eSBRaLaKaaY +∂++++= 3210  (1) 
where i is industry, s is state and j is firm. Y is gross value added, K is capital stock, L 
is total number of employees, SBR is our measure of state-business relations, ∂i are 
industry fixed effects and e is the error term. For the year 2000-01, we use SBR 
averaged over 1994-2000 and for the year 2004-05, we use SBR averaged over 2001-
2005.  
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We would expect that a3 is positive and significant – i.e., more effective SBR (as 
captured by a higher SBR score) should lead to improved total factor productivity. We 
estimate equation 1 for both the years – 2000-01 and 2004-05. We also expect an 
increase in value of a3 over the period, as economic reforms may have made an 
effective SBR more conducive to stronger firm performance. 
The industry fixed effects capture industry-specific differences in technology which 
would be correlated with TFP. They also capture other industry specific differences 
which would affect TFP such as differences in market structure and trade orientation. 
Since we cover units of all sizes, we first estimate equation (1) using Ordinary Least 
Squares, with robust heteroskedasticity constant standard errors. However, it is 
possible that unobserved technology shocks may be correlated with both, capital stock 
and output, leading to a bias in estimate of a1. In order to correct for this, we also 
estimate equation (1) using two-stage least squares with materials as an instrument for 
capital stock.  
Equation (1) assumes that effective state-business relations would affect all firms 
equally, regardless of their individual characteristics. However, as the literature on the 
institutional determinants of firm performance makes clear, firm specific 
characteristics such as firm size, location, age and organisational form are crucial in 
explaining why some firms are better performers than others. We would expect that 
for a given Indian state, some firms would be better positioned or more able to take 
advantage of effective SBR, given their institutional characteristics. We investigate 
the impact of effective SBRs on firm performance across various firm-specific 
characteristics and explore four such characteristics – the size of the firm (SIZE), the 
age of the firm (AGE), whether the firm is located in an urban area (URBAN) and the 
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organisational form of the form, captured by whether the firm is an individual 
proprietorship or not (ORG). 
With regard to firm size, we expect that smaller firms are more likely to benefit from 
improved SBRs that lead to better provision of public goods and greater information 
flows from government departments to the business associations small firms belong 
to. Also, smaller firms would not have the individual capacities of the larger firms to 
lobby for changes in policies and would benefit from stronger business associations 
that can lobby on their behalf.  With respect to firm age, we expect that older firms 
would benefit more from effective SBRs as they are more likely to be members of 
business associations than younger firms. With respect to location, firms in urban 
areas are more likely to be members of business associations and may be able to 
access the public goods that more effective SBRs may help provide.  
Finally, with respect to organisational form, privately owned firms, especially those in 
sole proprietorships, are more likely to benefit from effective SBRs, as compared to 
firms having diffused ownership. For a country like India where regulations abound, 
and many of the privately-owned firms often lack information for other key aspects of 
business such as finance, taxation etc., the effective SBR fills this obvious 
information gap. On the other hand, the information need from SBR is virtually 
negligent for a public limited company. This is because for a public limited firm, this 
information and other guidance comes from the outside directors, which hail from 
varied spheres like banking, or former govt. officials or academics.6 Furthermore, 
under clause 49 of listing agreement that came into effect after 2001 in the Indian 
capital market, the composition of board of public limited companies should comprise 
outside directors not less than 30 per cent. This implies that for public limited 
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companies since 2001 – there has been stronger presence of outside directors 
substituting the need for information obtained through effective SBRs.  
We measure firm size, firm location and firm age as binary variables – for firm size, a 
value of one if the firm has more than 100 employees, zero if not; for firm location, 
value of one if the firm is located in an urban area, a value of zero if not, and for firm 
age, a value of one for firms which have completed more than 10 years since 
inception, and a value of zero for those who have not. For measuring organisational 
firm, we have used an ordered variable with five organisational types in the order of 
increasing public involvement in these firms: the value ‘1’ is assigned to individual 
proprietorship firms, ‘2’ to joint family firms, ‘3’ to partnership firms, ‘4’ to private 
limited companies and ‘5’ to public limited companies. 
The augmented specification with the interaction variables between SBR and firm 
size, location, age and organisational form is presented in equation (2) below: 
(2)                                   *
* **
47
6543210
isjisisjs
isjsisjsisjssisjisjisj
eSBRaORGSBRa
AGESBRaURBANSBRaSIZESBRaSBRaLaKaaY
+∂++
++++++=
 
Where we expect that a4 and a7 are negative, while a5 and a6 are positive. 
We present the results of the estimates of equations (1) and (2) in the next section.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics for 2000-01 and 2004-05. For the 2000-
01 round, we have data for 24,361 units and for the 2004-05 round, it is 31,014 firms. 
There is variation in value added, capital stock and employment for the firms in our 
sample for both the years, though the summary statistics on value added, capital stock, 
employment, fuel and materials are not statistically very different for the two years. 
The SBR public, SBR practice and SBR collusive variables have remained more or 
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less the same, while the SBR private variable reported a significant improvement over 
the period 1994-2005, indicating an increase in information flow from business 
associations to its members. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 2000-01 (N=24361) 2004-05 (N=31014) 
VARIABLES Mean SD MIN MAX Mean SD MIN MAX 
Log GVA 14.72 2.21 0.62 24.00 14.70 2.17 2.83 24.25 
Log Capital Stock 14.76 2.72 -0.25 24.75 14.68 2.67 -0.42 25.66 
Log Employment 3.88 1.55 0 10.63 3.79 1.51 0 10.73 
Log Fuel 13.00 2.34 3.44 22.24 12.84 2.28 3.29 22.34 
Log Material 15.31 2.93 1.96 24.88 15.29 2.99 2.08 26.45 
Log SBR 0.177 0.017 0.135 0.210 0.188 0.020 0.132 0.225 
Log SBRpvt 0.123 0.025 0.067 0.168 0.161 0.044 0.067 0.245 
Log SBRpub 0.194 0.024 0.124 0.233 0.195 0.025 0.107 0.231 
Log SBRpract 0.195 0.030 0.111 0.236 0.196 0.027 0.128 0.236 
Log SBRcollu 0.200 0.034 0.105 0.264 0.215 0.026 0.133 0.252 
Notes: SD – Standard Deviation, MIN – Minimum, MAX – Maximum; Figures in bold means the 
difference is statistically significant over the two years. 
For 2000-01, the table presents the average log SBR and its components for 1994-2000 and for 
2004-05, the table presents the average log SBR and its components for 2001-2005.  
 
We next present estimates of equations (1) and (2) in Table 2 for the year 2000-01 and 
in Table 3 for the year 2004-05. These equations are estimated with the OLS methods 
and are presented in Cols. 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9. The estimation of the coefficients of labour and 
capital using OLS method implicitly assumes that the input choices are determined 
exogenously. Firm’s input choices can be endogenous too. For instance, the number of 
workers hired by a firm and the quantity of materials purchased may depend on unobserved 
productivity shocks. These are overlooked by the researcher but they certainly represent the 
part of TFP known to the firm. Since input choices and productivity are correlated, OLS 
estimation of production functions will yield biased parameter estimates. Wu-Hausman 
Test, as reported in row 10 of Tables 2 and 3 respectively, indicates that endogeneity 
is a serious problem with our OLS estimations. That may also be the reason that the 
coefficients of SBR, the interaction terms and other variables change across 
estimations. To correct this endogeneity bias, we estimate instrumental variable (IV) method 
with raw materials as instrument.  
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We begin with OLS and IV estimates of equation (1) in Cols. (1) and (2) of Tables 2 
and 3 respectively. We then present OLS and IV estimates of equation (2) in Cols. (3) 
to (10) in Tables 2 and 3, interacting the SBR variable with each firm characteristic in 
turn – firm size, location, age and firm organisation. Since the interaction variables 
are very likely to be collinear, we enter these interaction variables one by one, rather 
than jointly.  
As is evident from Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients on labour and capital inputs have 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for both the 
years. We find that the coefficient on the SBR measure is positive and significant in 
the OLS estimates for 2000-01 and both the OLS and IV estimates when entered on 
its own without any interaction terms (Cols. (1) and (2) of tables 2 and 3).  When we 
add interaction terms of firm characteristics with SBR, the SBR variable remains 
positive whenever it is statistically significant. More over, the size of the coefficient 
on the SBR variable is higher for 2004-05 (without interaction terms) than for 2000-
01. This suggests that the impact of effective SBR has increased with a more 
favourable economic environment possibly brought about by reforms. Overall, our 
results strongly support the proposition that effective state-business relations matter 
for firm performance.   
The results in Tables 2 and 3 also indicate that the effect of SBR differs across firm 
size (Cols. (3) and (4) for Tables 2 and 3). It is observed that the interaction term 
between firm size and SBR is negative and significant in all cases, suggesting that 
smaller firms perform better with better SBR. It is possible that a good business 
environment eases the growth constraints faced by small firms (Ayyagari and 
Maksimovic 2008).7 A similar argument is also posed by Dollar et al. (2005) that 
smaller firms could benefit from more effective SBR, provided they have access to 
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better infrastructure. According to Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart (2004), smaller 
firms stand to gain more from broad-based investment climate improvements than 
larger firms.  
As hypothesised in the previous section, we find from Cols. (5) and (6) of tables 2 and 
3 that the effects of effective SBR is more pronounced in firms located in urban areas 
than in those located in rural areas – the interaction term between URBAN and SBR 
is positive and significant for both OLS and IV estimates, and for both the years 2000-
01 and 2004-05. We also observe that the impact of SBR on firm performance 
increases with the age of the firm – the interaction term between AGE and SBR is 
positive and significant in the OLS and IV estimates for 2000-01 and 2004-05. That 
is, older firms derive more benefit from more effective SBR. With respect to 
organisation type, as conjectured, we find that more effective SBR provides greater 
benefits to firms with simpler organisational structures (i.e., individual 
proprietorships) or firms with less public involvement. The interaction term between 
ORG and SBR is negative and significant in the IV estimates for 2000-01 and 2004-
05 respectively. 
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 Table 2: Regression Results, OLS and IV = 2000-01 
VARIABLES I II III IV V 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
           
Capital 0.316* 0.709* 0.316* 0.708* 0.320* 0.706* 0.319* 0.720* 0.307* 0.752* 
 (0.00582) (0.00975) (0.00582) (0.00974) (0.00586) (0.00963) (0.00599) (0.00997) (0.00604) (0.0117) 
Labour 0.825* 0.331* 0.835* 0.345* 0.824* 0.342* 0.819* 0.302* 0.820* 0.332* 
 (0.00830) (0.0133) (0.0102) (0.0150) (0.00832) (0.0131) (0.00858) (0.0139) (0.00813) (0.0141) 
SBR 1.076* 0.384 1.158* 0.491 0.683* -0.392 0.980* -0.333 -0.295 1.570* 
 (0.401) (0.486) (0.403) (0.489) (0.403) (0.484) (0.403) (0.487) (0.406) (0.509) 
Size*SBR   -0.228* -0.292*       
   (0.127) (0.155)       
Urban*SBR     0.786* 1.589*     
     (0.0762) (0.0922)     
Age*SBR       0.260* 2.004*   
       (0.0707) (0.0951)   
Org*SBR         0.201* -0.630* 
         (0.0228) (0.0345) 
Constant 6.797* 2.710* 6.751* 2.660* 6.737* 2.696* 6.770* 2.620* 7.051* 2.268* 
 (0.181) (0.281) (0.184) (0.283) (0.179) (0.279) (0.180) (0.282) (0.197) (0.304) 
Ind. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wu-Hausman 
Test for 
Endogeneity 
 3540.35 
(0.00) 
 3536.92 
(0.00) 
 3473.11 
(0.00) 
 3520.04 
(0.00) 
 3222.35 
(0.00) 
N 24303 24303 24303 24303 24303 24303 24300 24300 23252 23252 
R-squared 0.830 0.738 0.830 0.739 0.830 0.743 0.830 0.739 0.833 0.728 
Note: * statistically significant at minimum 10 per cent level. Figures reported in the parentheses are standard errors.  
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Table 3: Regression Results, OLS and IV = 2004-05 
VARIABLES I II III IV V 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
           
Capital 0.307* 0.651* 0.307* 0.649* 0.310* 0.647* 0.311* 0.652* 0.299* 0.697* 
 (0.00495) (0.00798) (0.00495) (0.00794) (0.00498) (0.00786) (0.00506) (0.00797) (0.00527) (0.00952) 
Labour 0.849* 0.423* 0.880* 0.463* 0.850* 0.437* 0.842* 0.413* 0.835* 0.410* 
 (0.00673) (0.0108) (0.00836) (0.0121) (0.00674) (0.0105) (0.00689) (0.0109) (0.00661) (0.0113) 
SBR 2.278* 1.373* 2.466* 1.604* 1.993* 0.891* 2.111* 0.642* 1.576* 2.760* 
 (0.273) (0.319) (0.274) (0.320) (0.273) (0.318) (0.273) (0.319) (0.277) (0.337) 
Size*SBR   -0.638* -0.765*       
   (0.102) (0.120)       
Urban*SBR     0.688* 1.218*     
     (0.0578) (0.0682)     
Age*SBR       0.278* 1.321*   
       (0.0528) (0.0668)   
Org*SBR         0.216* -0.466* 
         (0.0168) (0.0252) 
Constant 6.515* 2.785* 6.400* 2.674* 6.452* 2.776* 6.494* 2.859* 6.655* 2.230* 
 (0.150) (0.215) (0.152) (0.216) (0.149) (0.213) (0.149) (0.213) (0.156) (0.230) 
Ind. dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wu-Hausman 
Test for 
Endogeneity 
 3788.42 
(0.00) 
 3755.64 
(0.00) 
 3701.12 
(0.00) 
 3689.49 
(0.00) 
 3638.1 
(0.00) 
N 31014 31014 31014 31014 31014 31014 30933 30933 30004 30004 
R-squared 0.851 0.780 0.851 0.781 0.852 0.784 0.852 0.784 0.854 0.768 
Note: * statistically significant at minimum 10 per cent level. Figures reported in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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Impact of SBR components 
We have also examined the impact of four components of SBR (SBR private, SBR public, 
SBR practice and SBR collusive) on firm performance by estimating the IV regression model 
(equation 1). Results in Table 4 indicate that the SBR private and SBR practice components 
have a positive and significant effect on TFP for 2004-05, while the SBR collusive 
component has a similar effect on TFP for 2000-01. However, the SBR public dimension 
seems to have a negative and significant effect on TFP for the year 2000-01. This latter 
finding may possibly reflect the fact that setting up of corporations by the state and public 
expenditure on economic sectors has not led to the provision of high quality public goods that 
matter for private sector performance (Panagariya 2008). Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
private, practice and collusive dimensions of the overall SBR measure have contributed to the 
overall positive impact of effective SBR on firm performance.  
In addition, we have looked at whether our findings with regard to the control variables are 
consistent across SBR components. We find that the interaction effect of SBR and the control 
variables are similar across these components (Table 5). That is, small sized firms, firms in 
urban areas, older firms and firms with simpler organisational structures (less public 
participation) do better across all dimensions of SBR. The results with the interaction terms 
between SBR and firm location and between SBR and age are somewhat surprising with the 
SBR coefficients becoming negative across almost all dimensions of SBR. However, this can 
be explained by the fact that the effective SBR primarily indicates effectiveness of business 
associations, most being urban focused and more applicable to older firms. Furthermore, we 
noticed that the net effect of SBR captured in the summation of the SBR term on its own and 
the interaction of SBR with firm location on one hand and the age on the other is always 
positive across all the dimensions of SBR.  
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Table 4: IV estimates: SBR Components 
Variables SBR Private SBR Public SBR Practice SBR Collusive 
2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 
Capital  
0.71* 
(0.01) 
0.65* 
(0.01) 
0.71* 
(0.01) 
0.65* 
(0.01) 
0.71* 
(0.01) 
0.65* 
(0.01) 
0.71* 
(0.01) 
0.65* 
(0.01) 
Labour 0.33* (0.01) 
0.43* 
(0.01) 
0.34* 
(0.01) 
0.42* 
(0.01) 
0.33* 
(0.01) 
0.42* 
(0.01) 
0.33* 
(0.01) 
0.43* 
(0.01) 
SBR 
Component 
0.43 
(0.31) 
1.02* 
(0.14) 
-0.67* 
(0.32) 
-0.24 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.65* 
(0.23) 
0.86* 
(0.22) 
-0.32 
(0.24) 
Ind. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 24361 31014 24361 31014 24361 31014 24361 31014 
R-squared 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.78 
Note: * statistically significant at minimum 10 per cent level. Figures reported in the parentheses are standard 
errors. 
 
Table 5: IV Results for SBR components 
Sl. 
No Variables 
SBR Private SBR Public SBR Practice SBR Collusive 
2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 
1 
SBR 322.2* (11.84) 
146.6* 
(4.597) 
631.0* 
(37.39) 
586.5* 
(34.30) 
642.5* 
(50.80) 
779.8* 
(65.30) 
356.2* 
(16.99) 
687.2* 
(48.44) 
Size*SBR -21.71* (0.805) 
-9.840* 
(0.313) 
-43.50* 
(2.580) 
-40.92* 
(2.396) 
-44.04* 
(3.479) 
-53.54* 
(4.481) 
-24.20* 
(1.153) 
-47.26* 
(3.323) 
2 
SBR -1.398* (0.329) 
0.193 
(0.148) 
-1.431* 
(0.322) 
-0.798* 
(0.244) 
-0.622* 
(0.249) 
0.119 
(0.226) 
-0.0300 
(0.224) 
-0.992* 
(0.233) 
Urban*SBR 2.456* (0.135) 
1.431* 
(0.0786) 
1.496* 
(0.0857) 
1.188* 
(0.0671) 
1.365* 
(0.0841) 
1.125* 
(0.0668) 
1.388* 
(0.0823) 
1.065* 
(0.0611) 
3 
SBR -1.504* (0.331) 
0.0952 
(0.149) 
-1.613* 
(0.326) 
-0.932* 
(0.245) 
-0.829* 
(0.250) 
0.0509 
(0.225) 
-0.151 
(0.224) 
-1.110* 
(0.233) 
Age*SBR 2.875* (0.138) 
1.491* 
(0.0770) 
1.850* 
(0.0885) 
1.283* 
(0.0659) 
1.793* 
(0.0865) 
1.272* 
(0.0656) 
1.781* 
(0.0853) 
1.179* 
(0.0601) 
4 
SBR 4.038* (0.355) 
3.239* 
(0.173) 
1.509* 
(0.346) 
1.205* 
(0.261) 
1.469* 
(0.277) 
1.806* 
(0.249) 
2.550* 
(0.261) 
0.860* 
(0.257) 
Org*SBR -0.894* (0.0486) 
-0.522* 
(0.0280) 
-0.586* 
(0.0320) 
-0.456* 
(0.0247) 
-0.565* 
(0.0315) 
-0.448* 
(0.0247) 
-0.542* 
(0.0303) 
-0.417* 
(0.0225) 
Note: * statistically significant at minimum 10 per cent level. Figures reported in the parentheses are standard 
errors. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examine the institutional determinants of firm performance. In contrast to 
the previous literature which focuses mainly on institutional determinants which are internal 
to the firm such as managerial capabilities and technological competencies, we focus on the 
external institutional environment that may affect firm performance. We identify this as 
effective state-business relations, which are synergistic relationships between the state and 
the business sector, Using a measure of effective state-business relations developed by Cali et 
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al. (2009) and firm-level data for the entire Indian formal manufacturing sector for 2000-01 
and 2004-05, we show that effective state-business relations have had a significant positive 
effect on total factor productivity for formal manufacturing sector firms in India. We also 
find that the effect of the external institutional environment on firm performance is dependent 
on specific firm characteristics – firms with certain characteristics are more likely to benefit 
from effective state-business relations than others. We find that smaller firms, firms in urban 
areas, older firms and firms with simpler organisation structures (less public participation) do 
better with more effective state-business relations. This suggests that both internal and 
external institutional factors matter for firm performance and the effects of external and 
internal institutional determinants on firm performance are strongly complementary.  
Our disaggregated analysis of which dimension of state-business relations matter most for 
firm performance suggest that the private, practice and collusive components contribute to 
the overall impact of effective SBR on firm performance. However, the public dimension of 
effective state-business relations seems to have a negative effect on TFP. Thus our results 
suggest that it is important to improve the quality of public goods provided by the sub-
national state governments which can further enhance the impact of other sub-components. 
Overall, our finding suggests that there is a need to strengthen the collaborative relationships 
between the state and the business sector to enhance the performance of firms in the 
manufacturing sector. As has been witnessed in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the 
formalisation of interactions between the state and the business sector can occur through 
public-private dialogues on issues having direct implications for firms’ growth.  
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End Notes 
                                                 
1 An alternate set of arguments on the external institutional determinants of firm performance, propounded by 
the World Bank, among others, is that the investment climate – understood to be the institutional, policy and 
regulatory environment in which firms operate – has a strong impact on firm performance. However, as Moore 
and Schmitz (2008, p. 10) have argued, “the core conceptual problem with (this view) is that government and 
political power are viewed primarily as persistent threats to capital, investment and economic growth. From that 
perspective, the policy mission is to curtail the influence of political power through formal rules, laws and 
institutions. If that mission fails, politicians are expected at least to maltreat the private economy, and possibly 
to loot it, and thus, undercut economic growth.”   Thus, there is a strong assumption in this literature that the 
state, by its very nature, is always predatory, and cannot be developmental in most instances of its 
manifestations.  In this paper, we take an opposite view: that ‘good growth-enhancing relations between 
business and government elites are possible’ (Maxfield and Schneider 1997) and that effective state-business 
relations are the core external institutional determinants of firm performance.   
2 See Qureshi and te Velde (2007) and Sen and te Velde (2009) for evidence that improvements in state-business 
relations improve economic performance both at the micro and macro levels, for Sub Saharan Africa. 
3 We have experimented with different weights for the apex and the two sectoral business associations in the 
construction of the SBR private variable with no change in the results.  
4 The enterprises which employ less than 20 workers without the use of electricity or 10 workers with the use of 
electricity or are not producing hazardous substances (such as chemicals) fall under the unorganized/informal 
sector, as these are firms that are not required to register with the authorities under the Indian Factories Act of 
1948.  
5 We cleaned the data in following two steps - omitted units reporting zero or negative capital stock, zero output 
and zero employment; and as in 2000, the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh were bifurcated to 
form new states Uttrakhand, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand, these three states were merged with their parent states 
so as to have consistency with SBR variable. 
6 There is strong evidence that in case of India the presence of outside directors on boards are associated with 
improved firm performance (Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
7 Ayyagari and Maksimovic (2008) demonstrate that a good business environment improves the growth of 
industries that are naturally composed of small firms more than large-firm industries. In their view, small firm 
dominated industries gain from less stringent and more business friendly regulations associated with starting and 
closing a business, licensing requirements, exporting and importing, employment hiring and firing decisions, 
paying taxes, protecting investors and obtaining credit. 
